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INTRODUCTION 
Lewis Richardson's (1960a,first published 1939) 
venture to develop a mathematical theory of arms races 
was initially brought to the attention of a wider au-
dience when Anatol Rapoport (1957) published his review 
article "Lewis F. Richardson's Mathematical Theory of 
War". This piece unleashed a veritable avalanche of 
formal theorizing and empirical research about arms races 
in subsequent years. The wealth of theoretical and em-
pirical arms race studies has been well-documented in 
bibliographies (Cioffi-Revilla 1979) and reviews of the 
literature (Busch 1970, Moll and Luebbert 1980, Intri-
ligator 1976, 1982). In modern textbooks, formal model-
ling of arms races is distinguished as one of the major 
scientific approaches to the study of international re-
lations (Zinnes 1976), doctoral theses (e.g. Schrodt 
1977, Smith 1978) and stimulating monographs (Nincic 
1982) have emerged from the field. 
The purpose of this contribution can be defined 
negatively in two respects: neither is it an attempt to 
summarize, classify, or evaluate the body of existing 
research on mathematical models of arms races, nor will 
an effort be presented to empirically validate particular 
models from the Richardsonian tradition in a specific 
historical situation. Instead, this article will be de-
voted to a systematic summary of the most important and 
pressing difficulti.es and problems encountered in em-
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pirical analyses within the framework of formal arms 
race models. There is no claim, therefore, to be inno-
vative. The current state of the discipline is to be 
put into perspective by clarifying the key theoretical 
and methodological obstacles that arms race research 
has to cope with. Thus, all that is to be achieved is 
to illuminate what kind of intellectual challenges have 
emerged in the process of refining and applying the 
original models set forth by Richardson over the past 
quarter century. Such an appraisal should lead to a more 
adequate grasp of what has and has not been achieved 
~o far and what lies in the future, why certain expec-
tations have been disappointed and why certain avenues 
for further research appear as more profitable than 
others. One by one, the following issue-areas will be 
addressed: 
- How do we define "arms races"; what cases constitute 
our universe for empirical research? 
- How do arms race models relate to more general models 
of arms acquisition? 
- How do problems of measurement, operational definition, 
and available data affect empirical arms race research? 
- To what extent has empirical arms race research con-
tributed a meaningful separation of external from inter-
nal determinants of military efforts? 
- How does the fact that arms race parameters vary within 
and between arms races affect the theoretical status 
of these models; what could be done about this? 
- Are there specif ic problems of estimation and methodo-
logy that haunt the empirical validation of models from 
the Richardsonian tradition? 
- To what extent are arms races and the onset of war re-
lated to each other? 
WHAT IS AN ARMS RACE? 
In a very general sense, arms race models claim to 
explain observable behavior of nationql states. Empir-
ical tests constitute attempts to falsify such models. 
The key question is, for what cases do those models 
claim to be valid, unless they explicitly aim at des-
cribing particular historical phenomena. This, however, 
would imply forsaking the general nature of theory as 
fitting curves to particular historical cases is al-
ways possible. The generality and organizing power of 
theories is the higher the less variables they involve 
and the higher the number of cases to which they apply. 
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If empirical arms race research is conceived of as a 
rigorous attempt to systematically establish the empir-
ical validity of rather general hypotheses, a clear 
notion of the universe of cases to which these models 
apply has to exist. 
This problem of definition is largely neglected in 
the arms race literature. Typically, models are con-
structed, refined, and modified with particular histor-
ical confrontations in mind, and the em9irical evalu-
ation of the goodness of their fit is performed with 
that parti~ular case. The requirement to test a general 
model across a multitude of cases, preferably across 
all available cases, which would be derived from a strict 
adherence to the principles of the philosophy of science, 
so far has not been taken very seriously. 
Accordingly, no satisfactory historical inventory 
of arms races is available: when, where, between which 
actors and how lang they have taken place, when they 
have started and ended. Such an inventory should be 
comparable to the historical compilations of wars among 
nations supplied by Richardson (1960b), Wright (1965), 
and Singer and Small (1972). 
Elsewhere (Rattinger 1975a) I have extensively dealt 
with the issue of operationally defining arms races, 
which is an essential prerequisite for systematically 
compiling such a universe of cases along standardized 
criteria. To arrive at rigorous and comparable empirical 
research on arms races, the following main difficulties 
of the operational delimitation of arms races would have 
to be solved: 
First, if there is consensus that at least bilateral 
more or less rapid increases of armaments have to occur 
in order to qualify this process as an arms race, an 
immediate and obvious linkaqe to the problem of the 
appropriateness of indicators arises. In what respect do 
we have to observe increases, in armament expenditures, 
in military manpower, in the numbers of weapons systems, 
in military potential, in the lethality of weapons, in 
fighting power, or in combat readiness? What does it 
mean if some of these dimensions build up while others 
stay the same or even go down? Do we talk about arms 
races if annual increments of arms spending simply re-
f lect increases in the nominal or real income of mili-
tary personnel? 
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Second, do perceptions of hostility and mutual di-
rectedness of the military effort have to be an integral 
part of the operational definition of an arms race? How 
is mutual stimulation to be ascertained, and can this be 
achieved without referring to data on perceptions and 
declarations by both sides? Should we talk about arms 
races if there are no such mutual perceptions and de-
clarations? 
Third, the onset and termination of arms races have 
to be defined unequivocally. we have to consider, whether 
this should be done via the behavioral and/or the per-
ceptual component. This problem is essential for re-
search on the relation between arms races and wars. If 
there is no comprehensive collection of well-defined 
cases including precise information about onset and ter-
mination, very little can be meaningfully said on whether 
arms races do or do not lead to war. 
Fourth, should the term "arms race" be restricted 
to interactions with a clearly hostile component, do 
both sides have to perceive military action against 
each other as one possible course of future behavior? 
Alternatively, should the term be extended to cases 
where not military threat, but rather military prestige 
is at stake, as is often said about the armament build-
up in Latin America? 
Finally, how are.arms races with more than two 
participants to be dealt with conceptually? This problem 
has two dimensions. The first is the disaggregation of 
the military behavior of one nation that is racing 
against more than one opponent: what components of its 
military effort are due to each of the races it is in-
volved in, what components have to be counted in all 
those races? The second dimension is the treatment of 
arms races between alliances: do such processes con-
stitute races of alliance against alliance, or are they 
to be decomposed into reaction functions for each in-
dividual nation, possibly reacting to all of the other 
alliance or to particular nations out of this other 
alliance? 
These problems can be illustrated by comparing the 
lists of cases presented by Smith (1978) and by Wallace 
(1979, 1982). For the period 1860 to 1977 Smith enumer-
ates 32 arms races, for the longer period since 1816 Wal-
lace lists only 28 arms races. In the period where their 
lists overlap, both authors quote different cases, and 
sometimes different time-spans of arms races contained in 
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both compilations. The most extreme example is an arms 
race listed by Smith, but not by Wallace, between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and France starting in 1964. 
Both authors do not supply operational def initions but 
only conceptual explications of what they mean the term 
''arms race" to denote. Other historical inventories of 
arms races than these two are not available so far. 
ARMS RACE MODELS VS. ARMS ACQUISITION MODELS 
The problem of def ining arms races can be seen in 
a somewhat broader perspective if one conceives of arms 
race models as a kind of special case of more general 
models of the arms acquisition behavior of national 
states. Arms race models normally do not proceed from 
a systematic overview and classification of the various 
determinants of national armaments, but assume enemy 
arms to be the central determinant of own armament. In 
doing so, many components are neglected that are known 
to influence military armament, be it in an arms race 
or not. Figure 1 represents an attempt to compile various 
types of determinants of military behavior. It demon-
strates that arms race models neglect a series of such 
determinants. Nations in arms races are distinguished 
from other nations only by the coefficient a 8 in equa-
tion (2) that has to be different from zero. Nations 
that are not involved in arms races also react to the 
international situation, simply by maintaining armed 
forces. The international environment of nations can be 
subdivided in a threefold fashion: There are those com-
ponents that are longitudinally comparatively stable, 
e.g. a nation's position in the international system, 
its alliance involvement, its geographical position, 
its historical experience etc. Such variables influence 
the general level of the nation's military effort; they 
are responsible, e.g., for the fact that Israel devotes 
such a high share of its GNP to national security while 
Luxembourg spends so little. Second, there are dimen-
sions of the international environment of a nation that 
can vary more rapidly but do not characterize a nation's 
military environment, e.g. international tension levels, 
the climate of foreign relations with particular foreign 
countries, or transnational relations. Finally, the 
military effort and capabilities of surrounding nations 
and potential adversaries are the militarily most rele-
vant dimension of a nation's international environment.It 
can be more or less eo-linear with variables from the 
second group. Stable configurations of the international 
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environrnent deterrnine gross levels of military prepared-
ness, short-terrn fluctuations of the international sit-
uation can lead to short-terrn fluctuations of the mili-
tary effort that are superimposed upon those gross 
levels. This is what normally happens for all nations. 
But only if the fine-tuning of military behavior responds 
to that of other nations do we talk about an arms race. 
To evaluate the importance of other states' arma-
ments for determining a given nation's own military 
effort by means of established arms race models can be 
rather difficult. As a rule, they are more or less so-
phisticated variants of equation (5) and restrict the 
set of explanatory variables to the armament levels of 
both sides at a previous point in time. 
Even if one assumes the international situation to 
rernain roughly constant during an arms race, this implies 
a rnajor specification error. If equation (5) or similar 
equations are estirnated, the effects of excluded var-
iables will appear in coefficients b
1 
and b 2 , and the 
error term will no longer be randorn. Especially the 
aubregressive coefficient will pick up all kinds of 
relatively stable but excluded effects, such as resource 
constraints, econornic potential, bureaucratic budgeting, 
internal lobbying, and the irnpact of the international 
environment. Quantitatively weighting the importance 
of the arms race component against other components of 
armament increases is extremely difficult when such 
simple rnodels are applied. If reality should look some-
what sirnilar to Figure 1, models of the type of equa-
tion (5), that sumrnarizes the basic Richardsonian ideas, 
will have a rather hard time to make a rneaningful con-
tribution towards the explanation of the causes and 
consequences of military armaments. 
The widespread tendency to conceive of arms race 
research as separate from the general discussion of 
deterrninants of arrnarnent behavior, be it competitive 
or not, seems to constitute a rnajor disadvantage. The 
prograrn for ernpirical research should not be the Va-
lidation of Richardson models, but rather the more com-
prehensive question ''Why do nations arm the way they do?" 
For this broader question identifying reactive compo-
nents in a nation's military preparations is just a 
subset from the overall research agenda. Putting arms 
race research into the framework of this broader ques-
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Figure 1: A Model of Armament Behavior 
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tion also provides us with a much more useful perspec-
tive on the issue of how to set arms races apart from 
the "normal" time-path of military behavior. 
MEASUREMENT, DEFINITIONS, DATA 
The problem of measuring armaments is important 
from at least three different aspects. First, it is in-
timately related to the operational definition of what 
is an arms race. Second, we do have to have theoretical 
notions of what we mean by "arms", what we conceive arms 
races to be about, so we have to be sure that the em-
pirical indicators we use to measure these theoretical 
concepts are both reasonably valid and reliable. Finally, 
we have to stand up to the question whether our models 
and the indicators chosen to connect the realm of theory 
to the realm of observation are adequate for describing 
decision-processes going on in the real world. The first 
aspect has already been discussed above. Whether we be-
lieve arms races to be about manpower, military expen-
ditures, numbers of weapon systems, or particular mili-
tary capabilities (e.g. first-strike capability) has 
far-reaching implications for what our list of cases is 
going to look like. 
The second aspect, what do we mean by the "arms" 
or ''armaments" of a nation that are to be modelled, how 
are they to be operationally measured, which data are 
available and what is the quality of those data, is ex-
tremely complex. For a reasonably complete treatment it 
requires a separate contribution (see the articles by 
F. Hoeber, P. Stratmann, and R.K. Huber and B. Wobith 
in this volume). Suffice it therefore, to refer to just 
a few key concepts here. 
The reliability of armament expenditures, as a very 
popular indicator, is severely reduced by secrecy, con-
scious distortion on the part of many nations, anything 
but clear and standard criteria for reporting, etc. 
The validity of these indicators is questionable for a 
number of reasons. Armament expenditures confuse stock 
(salaries, maintenance) and flow (procurement, possibly 
also R&D) elements. Depending upon the type of recruit-
ment (draft vs. volunteer army) they can measure very 
different things, longitudinal and cross-country com-
parisons can be extremely hard to perform due to the 
necessity to adequately control for inflation, currency 
conversiön, and product-specific purchasing power. 
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If one chooses to rely on numbers of weapon systems, 
a series of problems are inevitably encountered. Ad-
equate data have to be found, one has to decide whether 
numbers are sufficient data or whether some weighting 
for performance characteristics of weapon systems has 
tobe done (Mihalka 1975). Furthermore, as soon as the 
common denominator of money is given up, one either 
has to solve the problem of how to trade off different 
types of weapon systems against each other or one has 
to disaggregate arms races into a series of component 
races (e.g. army, air force, naval races; Rattinger 
1976a). 
These difficulties get even more intricate if one 
enters the area of strategic arms races. Do we have to 
conceive of separate races, one nuclear and one con-
ventional, or is some type of aggregation feasible 
(Ward 1982)? Within the strategic arms race, the famil-
iar and politically debated distinctions of indicators 
are relevant for empirical arms race research as well, 
i.e. launchers vs. warheads vs. throwweight, and static 
(pre-strike numbers) vs. dynamic (numbers remaining 
after specific scenarios) comparison. 
The third dimension of the measurement problem is 
the adequacy of the type of reactions and the type of 
indicators that are being modelled to the real-world 
decision-processes on armament levels. Normally, em-
pirical arms race research does not at all take this 
issue into account. One could argue, however, that formal 
models of arms races and empirical attempts at their 
validation should be especially useful if they employ 
those indicators that are of major importance for de-
cision-makers. We have to ask whether the widespread 
use of highly aggregated military expenditure statis-
tics meets this requirement. Is this type of indicator 
actually in the foreground of political debate and 
decision-processes? This is not the place to give a 
definitive answer, but from this aspect of closeness to 
actual political decision-processes the use in arms 
race models of this simple indicator of overall national 
military spending - that has been criticized frequently 
and fervently - might even be rehabilitated. Remember, 
e.g., the heated debate going on in the U.S. since the 
early Seventies about whether or not the Soviet Union 
is outspending the U.S. on defense! 
On the other hand, the reactions to enemy armament 
behavior constituting the arms race might rather take 
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place in singular and discrete identifiable decisions 
on specific capabilities or procurement programs. Thus, 
we would have sporadic events of a large-scale response 
to enemy capabilities (e.g. the SLBM program, MIRV, ABM, 
or NATO's double-track decision of December 1979), in 
between these major reactive decisions we would have 
bureaucratic implementation, improvement, and expansion 
of those programs. While for arms races over military 
expenditures, military hardware, or manpower, adequate 
operational indicators can be designed, at least in 
principle, for this type of isolated reactive defense 
decisions, that in political reality might be extremely 
important, useful empirical indicators are not available. 
It can be argued, of course, that this type of singular 
reactive decision-making is not accessible for empirical 
arms race research, that this is the classical domain 
of historical case studies which prove superior to macro-
quanti tative methods of validating Richardson models. 
INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY EFFORTS 
As has been mentioned above in the context of 
Figure 1, weighting internal vs. external determinants 
of the level of military preparedness should be one of 
the key challenges for the empirical validation of arms 
race models. This was seen differently by Richardson 
himself who regarded the burden of a nation's armaments 
only as an inhibiting factor against further military 
build-up. Internal stimulation of armaments is derived 
from several separate considerations. First, it is 
argued that threat pirceptions and types of behavior 
resulting from them tend to adopt dynamics of their own, 
perpetuating increases of armament levels even if the 
threat from external actors that has initiated them has 
subsided. Second, military preparations are sometimes 
regarded as a fiscal instrument, decoupled from specific 
external threats, to stimulate the economy before elec-
tions in order to increase electoral support. Third, 
internal stimulation of the military build-up is often 
attributed to the activities of a military-industrial-
complex. Finally, internal stimulation can be argued 
to be important if organizational interests and bureau-
cratic momentum are taken into account. If one accepts 
the argument that in the battle for the budget all 
government agencies attempt to participate "adequately" 
in the distribution of available or additional resources, 
there is no reason to expect the behavior of military 
machineries to be any different. 
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This modification of Richardson's classical per-
spective, that military armaments acquired so far can 
not only impose restrictions upon further military 
growth but might, instead, stimulate it, for an empir-
ical assessment requires models that are more complex 
than the ones proposed by Richardson himself, e.g. 
models of the type that was presented in Figure 1. 
Available empirical research does not allow clear-cut 
answers to the question of weighting internal vs. ex-
ternal determinants of armaments. All that can be con-
fidently said today is that military build-ups of 
nations can be attributed to both groups of explanatory 
variables without any simple rank-order of importance. 
This has become very clear in the recent contribution 
by Cusack and Ward (1981), and has been demonstrated 
in detail by Russett (1983). 
The difficulties encountered when trying to dis-
entangle those factors can briefly be demonstrated by 
my own work (Rattinger 1975b) on the arms race between 
the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact up to the 
mid-Seventies (Table 1). At that time, this probably 
constituted the most complete effort to isolate the 
effects of those two groups of explanatory variables 
on the increases of armaments. The analysis essentially 
consisted of two-step regression models being run. In 
the first step, military expenditures were regressed 
upon those of the previous year. In the second step, 
residuals from these first regressions were run on 
identically constructed residuals for the opposing al-
liance. By definition, from the residuals from the first 
group of regressions all types of trends due to inter-
nal stimulation of armament levels have been eliminated. 
As a comparison of the standardized regression coef-
ficients in the first two columns of Table 1 demon-
strates, the auto-regressive component for most of the 
investigated nations was much strenger than the re-
active component measured by regressing a nation's re-
sidual defense spending upon residual defense spending 
of the hostile alliance. 
In view of the high multicollinearity between the 
national time-series of data, however, these findings 
have to be interpreted with some caution. The attempt 
to account for as high a share of the variance as pos-
sible by a first-order auto-regressive process is stat-
istically conservative, loading the findings in favor 
of rejecting the hypothesis of the existence of re-
active patterns. It can also lead, on the other hand, 
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Table 1 Standardized Regression Coefficients ( ß) for 
Best Fitting Models, 1950-1975, Source: 
Rattinger (1975b) 
Action-Reaction Tension-Armament 
Models Models Combined Models 
Residual defense 
Residual defense Residual defense spenc:Hng of 
spending of spend1ng of other a111ance 
Trend other alliance Trend Tension Trend other alliance Tens1un by Tension 
Country 
Belgium .94 .17 .90 .14 .06 
Derunark .96 .09 .95 .10 
France .90 .21 .81 . 19 .04 
West Gennany 
Greece .96 .07 .95 .09 
Italy .98 .02 .96 .OB .95 .09 
Luxembourg .65 .15 1.00 . 56 .53 
Holland .83 .21 
Norway .94 .14 .96 . \! .90 .16 
Portuqal 
Turkey 
Britain .36 .44 .84 .09 
Bulgaria .97 .20 .94 .13 .14 
Czechoslovakia .96 .18 .92 .16 . 91 .26 .15 
East Germany 
Hunqary .94 .24 
Po land .99 .02 .99 .02 .98 .03 
Rumania .98 .01 .97 .10 .93 .02 • 11 
USSR .97 .12 .94 .05 
European NATO .95 .10 .95 .10 .92 .14 
lfflJ .96 .03 .94 .14 .94 . II 
to an artificial diminution of the importance of enemy 
arms. The empirical weights contained in Table are the 
product of a previous theoretical decision on the se-
quence of entering explanatory variables. If this se-
quence were reversed, results most likely would look 
much different. For time-series data with a high degree 
of multicollinearity - that are typical of arms race 
situations the problem of numerically precise quan-
titative Separation of internal from external deter-
minants of armaments by means of formal arms race models 
has not yet been satisfactorily resolved. We oftentimes 
can validly state that both dimensions play an impor-
tant role, but are unable to identify one as strenger 
or even assign precise numerical weights to them. 
UNSTABLE PARAMETERS 
Another problem of utmost importance for the em-
pirical validation of arms race models in the Richard-
sonian tradition is the instability of model parameters 
within and between arms races. Richardson's classical 
models allow this to happen as little as the models 
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presented in Figure 1 do. The survey of the literature 
by Moll and Luebbert (1980) clearly demonstrates that 
in a multitude of empirical arms race studies a wide 
range of parameter estimates is reported. Sometimes re-
action coefficients have a negative sign, sometimes 
expense and fatigue" coefficients are positive (which, 
contrary to Richardson's expectations, suggests internal 
Stimulation, of course), sometimes there are drastic 
changes in parameters if arms races are broken down into 
separate periods (Rattinger 1975c, 1976a). 
To a certain extent the obvious reason is that many 
authors construct different models for the empirical 
analysis of different historical cases. However, there 
is a fundamental difficulty, too, i.e., the causal 
structures represented by the models are not invariant 
across space and time. This is a general difficulty of 
the empirical application of simple formal models in the 
social sciences. Richardson as a physicist maybe ex-
pected to detect some kind of "natural constants", by 
means of his simple models. In the meantime, we know 
that even with far more complex models there is no 
guarantee that causal structures will be constant. The 
social world, the world of armament behavior, seems to 
be much more complex than even rather refined systems 
of equations can grasp. 
The direction where a solution to this problem 
might be found is indicated by Figure 1. Richardson 
treated nations involved in arms races largely as black 
boxes. By incorporating the economic system, bureau-
cratic and social processes, the bJack box is somewhat 
opened in Figure 1. But this could go a lot further, 
e • g. by incorpora ting some of the condi tions for vary-
ing reactivity vis-a-vis enemy armaments into the models, 
by specifying parameters, that notoriously fluctuate, 
themselves to be functions of other variables that grasp 
the conditions under which such fluctuations take place. 
To put it short: In this situation it appears mandatory 
further to increase the complexity of arms race models, 
to expand them into open models with exogeneous vari-
ables, with variable parameters and interactive terms. 
The complexity of the models has to be brought some-
what closer to the complexity of the processes that are 
to be modelled. 
Ostrom (1977) and Ward (1982) in their contribu-
tions have heeded this necessity to a certain extent. 
Generally, however, this idea so far has not yet become 
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very popular, partially so because arms race research 
has been developed more from the side of pure theory 
than in response to the results and problems of em-
pirical analysis. For those primarily interested in 
formal models regardless of empirical validation, aban-
doning the black-box-approach delivers a severe blow, 
of course, as a multitude of derivations that have been 
extensively pursued since Richardson's original work 
(e.g. on conditions for equilibrium and criteria for 
stability) are no longer available for complex, non-
linear models involving exogenous variables. 
My own work on the East-West arms race contains 
some experiments with open models (Rattinger 1975b). 
International tension (Goldmann 1974) was introduced 
into the residual regression analysis brief ly described 
in the previous section as an additive exogenous var-
iable as well as interacting with the armament level of 
the hostile alliance, serving as a kind of ''filter" 
that would make enemy arms a more or less pressing con-
cern in decisions on defense with growing or receding 
tension levels. Estimation results for these models 
are also presented in Table 1 in the form of standard-
ized regression coefficients. This is not the place to 
repeat the substantive interpretation set forth in the 
original publication. Suffice it to say, that these 
ideas to investigate under what conditions various in-
fluences on armament behavior might be more or less 
relevant and to explicitely include these conditions 
into one's models via exogenous variables might, in 
fact, be very simple. However, they were not being pur-
sued before, at a time when empirical arms race re-
search was still heavily shaped by considerations of 
the formal elegance of the models, and less by criteria 
of empirical validation. Serious pursuit of these and 
similar simple ideas should prove a profitable strate-
gy for future empirical arms race studies. 
METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATION 
So far, this contribution has focussed upon the 
theoretical , conceptual, and operational problems en-
countered in the empirical validation of arms race 
models. Obviously, it is impossible to give a reason-
ably comprehensive presentation of the methodological 
issues facing such exercises here. Many of the most im-
portant topics have been raised by Luterbacher (1975) 
and myself (Rattinger 1976b). The discussion of metho-
dological problems will therefore be confined to a 
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brief enumeration of some of the more important aspects. 
First, empirical arms race research is haunted by 
multicollinearity among model variables. Time-series 
data of armaments, of economic potential, of economic 
burden, of requests of funds for the military, etc. are 
notoriously very highly correlated. This does not faci-
litate estimation of model parameters. 
Second, empirical arms race studies typically are 
not dealing with sample data, but with population data. 
The relevance and status of conventional statistical 
significance criteria therefore has to be critically 
reviewed and clarified. Even though almost all published 
work in the field heavily relies upon the basics of in-
ferential statistics, one might argue that consider-
ations of signif icance should be replaced by those of 
reproducibility, e.g. whether a given model represen-
ting a particular causal structure is conf irmed in 
various instances across time and space with roughly 
comparable numerical parameter estimates. 
Third, the availability of sometimes only very 
short time-series prevents the application of the same 
type of more complex models that have been developed 
for arms races of longer duration. If there are just a 
few points in time of measurement while we know that 
particular variables have to be included into models, 
there is a choice between the devil and the deep blue 
sea. Either one knowingly commits specification errors 
by setting up parsimonious models that can be estimated 
or one sticks to a model that is known to be more ad-
equate but cannot be estimated as too little degrees 
of freedom are left. 
Fourth, empirical application of arms race models 
often involves estimation of autoregressive processes 
from rather short time series. From the econometric 
literature it is known that this is an estimation sit-
uation where bias can occur. If lagged endogenous var-
iables are combined with autoregressive error terms, 
this estimation problem is confounded still. Therefore, 
everyone empirically estimating arms race models should 
be aware that research on the properties of estimation 
procedures for stationary and explosive autoregressive 
processes with systematically interacting error terms 
has not yet been developed very far. Thus, employing 
standard estimation techniques involves quite some con-
fidence that major distortions do not occur. 
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Finally, the estimation of discrete vs. continuous 
models has led to some heated debates, for some re-
searchers this seems to be an article of faith. Differ-
ential equations, of course, are the original Richard-
sonian vehicle, but due to the discrete nature of avail-
able data, many researchers have found it quite obvious 
to translate the logic of his arguments into difference 
equations. This also greatly facilitates empirical esti-
mation. Recently, however, interesting new approaches 
to estimating differential equations from discrete time-
series data have become available (Ward 1982), and it is 
conceivable that there will be a renaissance of differ-
ential equation models of arms races in the future. 
Naturally, proponents of differential vs. difference 
equations so far very neatly have divided along the 
line of theorists vs. empiricists, as the former type 
of equations lends itself much more easily to formal 
derivation while the latter type of equations is more 
handy for translation into empirical research. 
ARMS RACES AND WARS 
There are numerous exhortations empirically to in-
vestigate the relationship between arms races and the 
onset of war (e.g. Singer 1970), we lack, however, sys-
tematic research, but mainly encounter preconceived 
notions and judgments. These fall into two categories, 
hypotheses that military preparations make peace more 
secure ( si vis pacem, para bell um), and hypotheses 
that accumulation of arms makes the violent conduct of 
conflict more likely. The first hypotheses are basic to 
deterrence theory, the second hypotheses are character-
istic of Richardson's work. They reflect the fear of 
many people that arms that get stockpiled eventually 
get used. 
We face contradictory hypotheses, but the available 
empirical evidence is rare. The contributions by Wallace 
(1979, 1982, 1983; see also Weede 1980, Altfeld 1983) 
and Smith (1978) very well illustrate the two main ap-
proaches to the empirical study of the arms race-war 
connection and their major problems. The key issue in 
the empirical assessment of this connection is the 
extent to which arms race modelling and estimation has 
to be pursued bef ore anything meaningful can be said 
on whether or not arms races make wars more likely. 
Does one only have to ascertain the existence of arms 
races, or does one have to ascertain formal properties 
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of these processes that can only be evaluated in the 
framework of formal models? 
In the first case, the task is much rnore simple: 
One has to identify arms races and to establish whether 
they have been followed by war. This produces cross-
tabulations as Wallace has presented them. In the second 
case, duration, speed, acceleration, equilibrium and 
stability of arms races have to be evaluated and to be 
related to the outcorne of the process. This latter re-
search strategy requires the complexities of formal 
modelling of arms races to be satisfactorily resolved 
before statements on the relationship between arms 
races and wars become feasible. 
Wallace has chosen the simpler first avenue by 
identifying arms races along the criteria for "serious 
disputes", ascertaining whether prior to or during these 
serious disputes rapid escalations of military efforts 
have taken place and whether war has followed. Smith 
has chosen the more difficult research strategy, iden-
tifying arms races from articulations of political 
leaders on reactive components in their nation's arma-
ment behavior. She also considerably differentiates ex-
planatory as well as dependent variables, not only re-
cording, e.g. whether or not wars have occurred, but 
also registering various indicators of magnitude and 
duration of armed conflict. According to criteria of 
equilibrium and stability she attempts to identify dif-
ferent patterns of arms races, which presupposes, of 
course, extensive empirical estimation of formal arms 
race models. 
Describing Wallace's research design as rather 
simple is not meant to be derogatory. By virtue of the 
simplicity of the research design he manages to avoid 
many problems that Smith faces by sticking rather close-
ly to the Richardsonian tradition. She essentially esti-
mates models that are very close to the basic Richardson 
equations. As has been explained in the third section 
above, these equations are not overly realistic. Their 
empirical application commits drastic underspecif ication 
and yields unreliable estimates of the reactive com-
ponent of national armament policies, but they have nice 
and simple formal properties, especially on equilibrium 
and stability. If more realistic open models with the 
most probable exogenous variables were employed, these 
elegant formal properties would be lost. Smith has 
decided in favor of the first alternative with the 
result that she gets a multitude of bizarre estimation 
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results, to which she nevertheless courageously applies 
the criteria for stability suggested by Richardson. 
We have here, again, said a lot on models of arms 
races instead of on the arms race-war connection. This 
has been necessary in order to clarify what choices we 
face when having to decide on an adequate research 
design to study this relationship. Existing arms race 
research seems to permit the conclusion that it is quite 
straightforward to show that the presence of military 
armament of a particular gross level is related to the 
existence of armed forces in other nations, but that it 
is extremely hard to demonstrate precisely how specific 
levels of armaments or of military spending of two sides 
have interacted. There is no convincing approach to this 
problem available so far that could not be criticized 
under the criteria presented in this contribution. 
This seems to allow the conclusion that it might 
not be reasonable to construct a sequence of almost in-
surmountable obstacles, to set the solution of the 
questions of the quantitative disentanglement of various 
influences on armaments and of the one general and em-
pirically valid arms race model before any serious em-
pirical research on the relationship between armaments 
and wars. To make this point more simple: Instead cf 
talking about the arms race-war connection, one could 
talk about the armaments-war connection. This is an ex-
tremely important distinction as all of the connotations 
of "arms races" have vanished from such a research pro-
gram. Such a program could be less pretentious, but more 
realistic, if one is not so much interested in formal 
models but in the development of an early warning system 
for armed conflict. 
For this reason, the simple apprcach of Wallace 
can claim considerable sympathy, even t~ough undoubtedly 
there are shortcomings. Identifying arms races via 
serious disputes is as questionable as the criteria he 
adduces for ascertaining mutual stimulation of armament 
levels. An alternative to his approach would be further 
to develop the notion of "normal" military effort or 
of "normal" expansion of particular indicators of mili-
tary strength. Maybe there are patterns cf the develcp-
ment of military machineries that characterize situa-
tions of relatively low conflict, low mutual threat, 
and low probability of an escalation to war, e.g. con-
stant ratio of armed forces to population, constant or 
decreasing share cf GNP devoted to the military, roughly 
constant nominal growth of arms expenditures, stagnation 
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of military expenditures in real terms, etc. (see Rat-
tinger 1974). Maybe deviations from such "normal" pat-
terns are associated with military conflict later on. 
This research program might even be easier to tackle 
than that of Wallace, because individual nations -
instead of dyads - are the unit of analysis. In fact, 
this is a very simple research program: Is the proba-
bility of a nation getting involved in military con-
flict further down the road systematically associated 
with previous deviations of this nation from its regu-
lar and "normal" style of military preparation? 
This does not exclude the possibility to identify 
dyads of nations for whom this type of behavior can be 
observed in a parallel f ashion and that later on have 
either fought each other or resolved their dispute 
peacefully. The most important point is that this ap-
proach would not require to postpone meaningful results 
from such a miniature version of an early warning system 
until final solutions of the discussions about the ad-
equacy of particular arms race models and of particular 
estimation procedures have been established. Maybe the 
argument can be convincingly made that this is the di-
rection into which - considering the present state of 
the empirical validation of arms race models in the 
Richardsonian tradition - the study of the relation-
ship between armaments and wars could be most profitably 
developed. 
CONCLUSION 
This contribution has not presented a summary of 
empirical results on arms race models but has dwelt 
on the problems of modelling, of concept formation and 
of operationalization, as this appeared as more im-
portant and meaningful considering the present state 
of the discipline. What general conclusions do our dis-
cussions allow? 
In the Richardsonian tradition, theorizing and 
empirical study have moved apart to a certain extent. 
There are numerous examples of the purely immanent re-
f inemen t of Richardson's classical models. Empirical 
research has followed somewhat different paths, sacri-
ficing much of the analytic elegance of the classical 
models. The difficulties of immanent arms race theo-
rizing appear as minimaland - at least to this present 
author - as less important compared to those of em-
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pirical research that has developed into the direction 
of more comprehensive arms building models, thus inte-
grating arms race study with other behavioral approaches. 
The isolation of singular explanatory factors, that 
Richardson did pursue by his exclusive focus on arma-
ments, has proved to be untenable for empirical analysis. 
lt now addresses the really crucial issues, and in doing 
so has discovered the really crucial difficulties: What 
factors determine armament behavior, how are those many 
various influencing factors to be separated empirically, 
what are appropriate measurements, what is the quality 
of our sources of data, and how do reactive military 
processes work in reality? For empirical research, 
Richardson still supplies numerous valuable ideas what 
factors could be related to each other in what form, 
stimulating the specification of innovative models with 
empirical content. But his classical analyses of the 
formal properties of arms race models are less relevant 
for current empirical research. It appears as much more 
important to ascertain why particular models sometimes 
fit very well, sometimes not at all, why model parame-
ters change, etc. 
Opening arms race models to include exogenous var-
iables and giving up the purely mechanistic perspective 
has integrated arms race studies into general research 
on international relations, international conflict, and 
foreign policy decisions. If one is interested in formal 
models of international politics not for their own sake 
but in order to understand why and how particular forces 
drive processes within the real world, then this shift 
of focus is to be much welcomed. 
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DISCUSSION 
QUESTION: Does the research by Smith confirm Richard-
son' s predictions on the arms race-war connection? 
ANSWER: There is no clear-cut confirmation of Richard-
son' s assertion that arms races described by formal 
models without a stable equilibLium point necessarily 
should escalate into war at some time. In Smith's study 
the proportions of arms races without stable equilibrium 
and with a stable equilibrium that were followed by 
war were roughly equal. One has to admit, however, that 
the simplest version of Richardson models was used in 
this study. 
QUESTION: What predictive capabilities are associated 
with the shift in focus of empirical arms race research? 
ANSWER: There has to be a distinction between prediction 
of war from previous armament behavior and prediction 
of arms levels. Richardson himself, who was less inter-
ested in systematically analyzing all the various fac-
tors influencing national armament policies, predomi-
nantly focussed on the prediction of war from the 
200 
formal properties of the rnodels describing competitive 
armament processes. One can argue that this approach, 
that has been closely imitated by Smith, at present 
does not appear as very prornising because of the many 
problems associated with the empirical validation of 
Richardson-type models that have been described. There-
fore, one could resort to the simpler attempt to find 
criteria for dynamic equilibrium or ''normal" patterns 
of armament behavior. This could eventually be turned 
into an early warning system that would attempt to 
predict the onset of war from "abnormal" military ef-
forts of one nation or of pairs of nations. 
The second predictive goal of comprehensive armament 
building models, i.e. prediction of armament levels, 
can be achieved only to a limited extent. As soon as 
exogenous variables are included, which in many cases 
could prove mandatory, predictions either have to be 
very short-range or they are valid only under compre-
hensi ve assumptions of ceteris paribus. 
QUESTION: As to the relevance of indicators of arma-
ment levels for decision-processes, should one dis-
tinguish between indicators that actually are used as 
the basis for decision and others that are employed to 
publicly support or defend such decisions? 
ANSWER: Even though the details of actual decision-
processes on military budgets and arms programs gener-
ally are not publicly accessible, there is ample reason 
to suppose that, at least at the very high political 
level, the arguments and criteria used in actual de-
cision-making are not very much different from those 
that prevail in public political discussions. These 
top-level political decisions are what finally matters. 
That the sizing and costing of military forces is de-
rived from objective threat assessment via an analytic 
process given security requirements and own and enemy 
capabilities is a myth. It is very likely that in poli-
tics the simple question of "how rnuch is enough?" is 
actually treated as a simple question involving crude 
numbers of weapon systems and billions spent, even 
though for the military operations researcher it might 
be an optimization problem involving several hundreds 
of variables. 
QUESTION: Is there a lack of communication between 
theorists and empiricists in arms race research? 
ANSWER: What David Singer once termed the "two culture 
problem" pervades arms race research as much as most 
other substantively delimited fields of social science. 
This is not exclusively due to ill will, incompetence, 
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or ignorance, but also to different backgrounds of 
training and professional experience. This state is not 
quite satisfactory, however. To be a good empirical re-
searcher one has to listen what other people have to 
say on what factors could or should be related in what 
way. To be a good theorist one should occasionally 
listen to what can be said about the empirical validity 
of one's deductions and assumptions. Maybe this is a 
purely personal perspective, but it appears that em-
pirical researchers so far have listene~ closer and have 
received more stimulation from analytical modelling than 
vice versa. 
QUESTION: Is the distinction between pure arms race 
modelling and applied arrns race research comparable to 
the distinction between normative and descriptive models 
in decision theory? 
ANSWER: This seems to be a very close analogy. Both 
approaches, when pursued in isolation, appear as scien-
tifically incomplete. In any discipline that refers to 
the real world, i.e. every discipline except mathernatics, 
the goal should be to draw on theoretical insight as 
much as possible to specify models with empirical con-
tent, then to attempt to validate them empirically, 
subsequently refining theory, etc. 
QUESTION: Are there compilations of data available that 
are appropriate for the empirical validation of arms 
race models? 
ANSWER: General sources for data on national armaments, 
particularly defense budgets and numbers of weapons 
systems, are widely known. When it comes to refining 
those highly aggregated and rather primitive indicators, 
however, e.g. by deriving indices of combat power and 
effectiveness from technical characteristics of weapon 
systems or by estimating rnilitary trade-offs between 
different types of forces, collection of data can be 
quite difficult and burdensome, sometimes virtually 
impossible. 
QUESTION: Can the assertion by the peace movernent that 
armaments lead to war be claimed as empirically vali-
dated? 
ANSWER: In line what has been said on the lack of sta-
bility of causal structures, any answer probably will 
have to be differentiated for different historical 
periods, if not for different regions of this world. 
According to Wallace, the argument brought forth by the 
peace rnovernent was essentially correct up to the Second 
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World War. Since then, deterrence seems not to have been 
confined to the nuclear confrontation between the super-
powers. 
QUESTION: Is there any spectacular example in history 
where the predictions of the Richarson models on the 
onset of war have come true? 
ANSWER: Richardson has provided this spectacular example 
himself by investigating the arms race prior to the 
First World War. His methods were not very sophisticated, 
however, and his application of his basic equations was 
rather arbitrary, e.g. by aggregating the nations of 
the two alliances that later were to fight each other, 
but excluding some of these nations without convincing 
arguments for doing so. Moreover, in his great book 
Richardson empirically tested just one of at least two 
formal deductions on what the data should look like if 
the armament process were to correspond to his equations. 
The second deduction, which he did not test, when ap-
plied to his own data in an analogous fashion in fact 
flatly disconfirms the model's fit. Still, Richardson 
maintained that his equations were fitting the data 
beautifully, that there had been no stable equilibrium, 
and that this had something to do with the onset of war 
later on. Most of the reviewers of his work showed 
themselves to be very much impressed. 
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